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Abstract. This paper presents simulation-based relations for proba-
bilistic game structures. The first relation is called probabilistic alter-
nating simulation, and the second called probabilistic alternating for-
ward simulation, following the naming convention of Segala and Lynch.
We study these relations with respect to the preservation of properties
specified in probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic.
1 Introduction
Simulation relations [15] have proved to be useful for comparing the behavior of
concurrent systems, which can be formally interpreted as labeled transition sys-
tems. The study of logic characterization of simulation is to build its connection
to a modal or temporal logic which can be used to formulate some interest-
ing properties. Soundness of logic characterization requires simulation preserve
the satisfaction of logic formulas, while completeness shows the relation has the
same strength as the logic. Intuitively, the fact that one state s1 simulates an-
other state s2 can be used to establish the relation that any possible behavior
of s1 is also possible on s2. Thus it can preserve certain desirable properties
formulated in temporal logics like CTL [11]. Simulation relations have set up
the foundations for constructing correct abstractions.
Related work. Segala and Lynch [21] extend the classical notions of simulation
for probabilistic automata [20], a general extension of labeled transition systems
which admits both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviors. Their main
idea is to relate probability distributions over states, instead of relating individ-
ual states. They show soundness of the logical characterization of probabilistic
simulation, which preserves probabilistic CTL formulas [12] without negation
and existential quantification. Segala introduces probabilistic forward simula-
tion, which relates states to probability distributions over states and is sound
and complete for trace distribution precongruence [19, 13]. Logic characterization
of strong and weak probabilistic bisimulation has been studied in [10, 17].
Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman [1, 2] define ATL (alternating-time temporal
logic) to generalize CTL for game structures by requiring each path quantifier
to be parametrized with a set of agents. Game structures are more general than
LTS, in the sense that they allow both collaborative and adversarial behaviors
of individual agents in a system, and ATL can be used to express properties
like “a set of agents can enforce a specific outcome of the system”. Alternating
refinement relations, in particular alternating simulation, are introduced later
in [3]. Alternating simulation is a natural game-theoretic interpretation of the
classical simulation in two-player games. Logic characterization of this relation
concentrates on a subset of ATL? formulas where negations are only allowed at
proposition level and all path quantifiers are parametrized by a predefined set of
agents A. This sublogic of ATL? contains all formulas expressing the properties
that agents in A can enforce no matter what the other agents do. Alur et al. [3]
have proved both soundness and completeness of their characterization.
Our contribution. Extending game structures with probabilistic behaviors of
players gives rise to a more expressive framework for modeling (open) systems.
Mixed strategies, which allow for players to randomly select their actions, are
often necessary for the players to achieve their expected rewards [16]. As the
papers [3, 2] only focuse on pure strategies, it is a natural step to study the
corresponding notion of simulation in a probabilistic game-based setting.
In this paper, we introduce two notions of simulation for probabilistic game
structures — probabilistic alternating simulation and forward simulation, fol-
lowing the aforementioned results [19, 21, 3]. We prove the soundness of logical
characterization of probabilistic alternating simulation relations, by showing that
they preserve a fragment of a probabilistic extension of ATL.
Outline. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly explain some
basic notations that are used throughout the paper in Sect. 2. Sect. 3 introduces
the notion of probabilistic game structures and the definition of probabilistic ex-
ecutions. In Sect. 4 we present PATL an extension of the alternating-time tem-
poral logic [2] for probabilistic systems, and roughly discuss its model checking
problem. We define probabilistic alternating simulation and forward simulation
in Sect. 5, and show their soundness for preserving properties specified in PATL
in Sect. 6. Probabilistic alternating bisimulation is shortly discussed in Sect. 7.
We conclude the paper with some future research topics in Sect. 8.
2 Preliminaries
This section contains basic notions that are used in the technical part. Let S
be a set, then a discrete probabilistic distribution ∆ over S is a function of
type S → [0, 1], satisfying ∑s∈S ∆(s) = 1. We write D(S) for the set of all
such distributions. For a set S′ ⊆ S, define ∆(S′) = ∑s∈S′ ∆(s). Given two
distributions ∆1, ∆2 and p ∈ [0, 1], ∆1 ⊕p ∆2 is a function of type S → [0, 1]
defined as ∆1 ⊕p ∆2(s) = p · ∆1(s) + (1 − p) · ∆2(s) for all s ∈ S. Obviously,
∆1 ⊕p ∆2 is also a distribution. We further extend this notion by combining a
set of distributions {∆i}i∈I ordered by an indexed set {pi}i∈I into a distribution∑
i∈I pi∆i, where pi ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ I and
∑
i∈I pi = 1. s is called a point
distribution satisfying s(s) = 1 and s(t) = 0 for all t 6= s. Let ∆ ∈ D(S), write
d∆e for the support of ∆ as the set {s ∈ S | ∆(s) > 0}.
Let S = S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn, then s ∈ S is a vector of length n. We may
also write s = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sn〉, with s(i) = si ∈ Si. Given a finite sequence
α = s1s2 . . . sn ∈ S∗, write last(α) for sn. Let S′ ⊆ S, then α | S′ is a subsequence
of α with exactly the elements not in S′ removed. Given L ⊆ S∗, write L | S′
for the set {(α | S′) | α ∈ L}.
3 Probabilistic Game Structures
Assume a set of players Σ = {1, 2, . . . , k}. A probabilistic game structure (PGS)
G is defined as a tuple 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉, where
– S is a finite set of states, with s0 the initial state,
– Act = Act1× Act2×· · ·× Actk is a set of joint actions, where Acti is the set
of actions for player i = 1, . . . , k,
– L : S → 2Prop is the labeling function,
– δ : S × Act→ D(S) is a transition function.
A play ρ is a (finite or infinite) sequence s0a1s1a2s2 . . ., such that ai ∈ Act and
δ(si−1,ai)(si) > 0 for all i. Write |ρ| for the length of a run ρ, which is the number
of transitions in ρ, and |ρ| =∞ if ρ is infinite. We write ρ(i) for the i-th state in ρ
starting from 0, and ρ[i, j] for the subsequence starting from i-th state and ending
at the j-th state, provided 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |ρ|. Note that the players choose their
next moves simultaneously, but their moves may or may not be cooperative.
If on state s each player i performs action ai, then δ(s, 〈a1, a2, . . . ak〉) is the
distribution for the next reachable states. In the following discussion, we fix a
probabilistic game structure G.
We assume that the transition function δ is total on the set Act. Note that
this does not pose any limitation on the expressiveness of the model. If an action
c ∈ Acti of player i is not supposed to be enabled on state s for player i, we
may find another action c′ ∈ Acti and define c to have the same effect as c′
on s. Since player i knows the current state, he also knows the set of actions
available to him, so that as a rational player he will not choose actions that are
not enabled. This allows such models to express systems in which on some states
the available (joint) actions are proper subsets of Act.3 We may even disable a
particular player on a state. A player i is disabled on s if δ(s,a) = δ(s,a′) for
all action vectors a,a′ ∈ Act satisfying a(j) = a′(j) for all j 6= i. A PGS is
turn-based if all but one player is disabled on s for all s ∈ S.
A strategy of a player i ∈ Σ is a function of type S+ → D(Acti). We write
ΠGi for the set of strategies of player i in G. A play ρ is compatible with an
i-strategy pii, if ak(i) ∈ dpii(ρ[0, k − 1]|S)e for all k ≤ |ρ|. Given a vector of
strategies pi ∈ ΠG1 × ΠG2 × · · · × ΠG|Σ|, a run ρ is compatible with pi if ak(i) ∈
dpi(i)(ρ[0, k − 1]|S)e for all k ≤ |ρ| and i = 1, . . . , k. Write G(pi, s) for the set
of infinite plays compatible with every strategy in pi starting from s ∈ S, and
G∗(pi, s) the set of finite plays in G that are compatible with pi starting from s.
3 In the literature some authors encode available actions for player i as a function of
type S → 2Acti \ {∅}.
The set of finite plays compatible to strategy vector pi is also called a set of
cones [20], with each finite play α representing the set of infinite plays prefixed
by α. Given a state s0 ∈ S, we can derive the probability for every member in S+
compatible with pi, by recursively defining a function PrG(pi,s0) from S
+ to [0, 1]
as follows. This function PrG(pi,s0) can be further generalized as the probability
measure to the σ-field FG,pi,s0 ⊆ G(pi, s0) which is a unique extension from the
set of cones G∗(pi, s) closed by countable union and complementation, in a way
similar to [20]:
– PrG(pi,s0)(s0) = 1,
– PrG(pi,s0)(α · s) = PrG(pi,s0)(α) · δ(last(α), 〈pi(1)(α),pi(2)(α), . . . ,pi(k)(α)〉)(s),
where δ(s, 〈∆1, ∆2, . . . ,∆k〉) is a distribution over states derived from δ and the
vector of action distributions defined by
δ(s, 〈∆1, . . . ,∆k〉) =
∑
i∈{1,...,k},ai∈d∆ie
∆1(a1) · . . . ·∆k(ak) · δ(s, 〈a1, . . . , ak〉).
Given A ⊆ Σ, sometimes we write pi(A) for a vector of |A| strategies {pii}i∈A,
and Π(A) for the set of all such strategy vectors. Write A for Σ \ A. Given
A ∩ A′ = ∅, strategy vectors pi ∈ Π(A) and pi′ ∈ Π(A′), pi ∪ pi′ is the vector of
strategies {pii}i∈A ∪ {pi′j}j∈A′ that combines pi and pi′.
We also define strategies of finite depth by restricting the size of their do-
mains, by writing pi ∈ ΠG,ni as a level-n strategy, i.e., pi is a function from traces
of states with length up to n (i.e., the set
⋃
m∈{1,2,...,n} S
m) to D(Acti). Given a
set of strategies {pii}i∈I of the same domain, and {pi}i∈I with
∑
i∈I pi = 1, let
pi =
∑
i∈I pi · pii be a (combined) strategy, by letting pi(γ) =
∑
i∈I pi · pii(γ) for
all γ in the domain.
We overload the function δ as from a state in S and a vector of strategies
(of any depth n) pi ∈ ΠG,n1 ×ΠG,n2 × · · · ×ΠG,n|Σ| to D(S), by δ(s,pi) = δ(s,a),
where a(i) = pi(i)(s) for all i ∈ Σ. Note each a(i) is a distribution over Acti. We
further lift δ to be a transition function from state distributions and strategy
vectors to state distributions, by
δ(∆,pi) =
∑
s∈d∆e
∆(s) · δ(s,pi)
Probabilistic Executions
We settle the nondeterminism in a probabilistic game structure by fixing the
behaviors of all players represented as strategies. Let G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉 be a
PGS, define a probabilistic execution E as in the form of 〈E,∆,LE , δE〉, where
– E ⊆ S+ is the set of finite plays starting form a state in the initial dis-
tribution and compatible with δE , i.e., s0s1 . . . sn ∈ E if s0 ∈ d∆e, and
δE(s0 . . . si)(s0 . . . si+1) > 0 for all 0 ≤ i < n,
– ∆ ∈ D(S) an (initial) distribution,
– LE is the labeling function defined as LE(e) = L(last(e)) for all e ∈ E,
– δE : E → D(E) is a (deterministic) transition relation, satisfying for all
e ∈ E there exists a (level 1) strategy vector pie, such that δE(e)(e · t) =
δ(last(e),pie)(t) if t ∈ dδ(last(e),pie)e, and 0 otherwise.
A probabilistic execution of G can be uniquely determined by a strategy vector
pi and a state distribution. Given ∆ ∈ D(S), define E(G,pi, ∆) as the proba-
bilistic execution 〈Epi, ∆,Lpi, δpi〉, with Epi = ⋃s∈d∆e G∗(pi, s) | S for the set
of compatible finite plays, Lpi defined as Lpi(e) = L(last(e)) for all e ∈ Epi,
and δpi(e) = δ(last(e),pie) for all e ∈ Epi, where pie(i) = pi(i)(e) for all i ∈ Σ.
Intuitively, a probabilistic execution resembles the notion of the same name pro-
posed by Segala and Lynch [20, 21], and in this case the strategies of the players
altogether represent a single adversary of Segala and Lynch.
4 Probabilistic Alternating-Time Temporal Logic
In this section we introduce a probabilistic version of alternating-time tempo-
ral logic [2], which focuses on the players ability to enforce a property with an
expected probability. Let Prop be a nonempty set of propositions. Probabilis-
tic alternating-time temporal logic (PATL) was initially proposed by Chen and
Lu [7]. Here we show its original syntax can be slightly simplified. PATL formulas
are defined as follows.
φ := p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | 〈〈A〉〉./αψ
ψ :=©φ | φ1U≤kφ2
where A ⊆ Σ is a set of players, ./∈ {<,>,≤,≥}, k ∈ N ∪ {∞}, p ∈ Prop, and
α ∈ [0, 1]. We also write ψ1U ψ2 for ψ1U≤∞ψ2 as ‘unbounded until’. The symbols
φ, φ1, φ2 are state formulas, and ψ is a path formula. We omit the syntactic
sugars in our definition, such as true ≡ p ∨ ¬p and false ≡ p ∧ ¬p for some
p ∈ Prop, φ1 ∨ φ2 ≡ ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2) for state formulas. The path modality R
can be expressed by U without introducing negations into path formulas, as we
will show later in this section. One may also define 2≤kψ ≡ false R≤kψ, and
3≤kψ ≡ true U≤kψ, where k ∈ N∪{∞}. The set of PATL formulas L are the set
of state formulas as defined above. We have the semantics of the path formulas
and the state formulas defined as follows.
– ρ |= φ iff G, ρ(0) |= φ where φ is a state formula,
– ρ |=©φ iff ρ(1) |= φ,
– ρ |= φ1U≤kφ2 iff there exists i ≤ k such that ρ(j) |= φ1 for all 0 ≤ j < i and
ρ(i) |= φ2,
– G, s |= p iff p ∈ L(s),
– G, s |= ¬φ iff G, s 6|= φ,
– G, s |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff G, s |= φ1 and G, s |= φ2,
– G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉./α ψ iff there exists a vector of strategies pi ∈ Π(A), such that for
all vectors of strategies pi′ ∈ Π(A) for players in A, we have PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈
G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ}) ./ α,
where ρ is an infinite play in G, α ∈ [0, 1], φ, φ1, φ2 are state formulas, and ψ
is a path formula. Equivalently, given S the state space of a probabilistic game
structure G, we write JφK for {s ∈ S | s |= φ} for all PATL (state) formulas
φ. For ∆ ∈ D(S), we write ∆ |= φ iff d∆e ⊆ JφK. Intuitively, G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉≥αψ
(G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉≤αψ) describes the ability of players in A to cooperatively enforce
ψ with probability at least (at most) α in s.
The following lemma is directly from the PATL semantics. If a group of users
A can enforce a linear-time temporal logic formula ψ to hold with probability at
least α with strategies pi ∈ Π(A), then at the same time pi enforces the formula
¬ψ to hold with probability at most 1− α. To simplify the notation, we let ‘∼’
denote changes on directions of the symbols in {<,>,≤,≥}, e.g., symbol ≥˜ for
≤, ≤˜ for ≥, >˜ for <, and <˜ for >.
Lemma 1. G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉./αψ iff G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉e./1−α¬ψ
Therefore, the path quantifier R (release) can be expressed by the existing PATL
syntax, in the way that 〈〈A〉〉./αφ1R≤kφ2 ≡ 〈〈A〉〉e./1−α(¬φ1)U≤k(¬φ2), where both
¬φ1 and ¬φ2 are state formulas.
On Model Checking of PATL
In this section we briefly survey the results in the literature related to PATL
model checking. Given a PATL formula in the form of 〈〈A〉〉./αψ(φ1, . . . , φn), a
standard way to solve this problem is to determine the maximal or minimal
probability that the players in A can enforce the LTL formula ψ(φ1, . . . , φn). In
the following we write ψ for ψ(φ1, . . . , φn) without further confusions.
LTL properties are special cases of ω-regular winning objectives [22] in two-
player concurrent (zero-sum) games [9, 6]. In such games one may group a set of
players A ⊆ Σ into a single protagonist and A into a single antagonist. Given an
ω-regular winning objective ξ and starting from a state s ∈ S, the protagonist
plays with a strategy trying to maximize the probability for a play to satisfy
ξ while the antagonist tries to minimize the probability. In such a game there
always exists a unique value in [0, 1], on which both players have strategies
to guarantee (or infinitely approach) their best performances, regardless of the
strategies played by their opponents. Such a supremum value (or infinum value,
as for the antagonist) is called the value of the game [14, 9]. In a probabilistic
multi-player game, we let a group of players A ⊆ Σ be a single player, and A
be the other, and the supremal probability for A to enforce an LTL formula ψ
starting from a given state s ∈ S can be uniquely determined, as defined by
〈A〉ψ(s) =
⊔
pi∈Π(A)
l
pi′∈Π(A)
PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ})
A vector of strategies, which does not necessarily exist, is optimal for a group of
players, if it enforces the value of the game for that group.
Fig. 1. An example showing that player I can guarantee to satisfy 3φ with probability
α for all 0 ≤ α < 1, but he cannot ensure that property with probability 1.
Example 1. Fig. 1 gives a PGS with two players {I, II}, initial state s0, ActI =
{a1, a2} and ActII = {b1, b2}. Note that this PGS is deterministic, i.e, no prob-
abilities in its transitions. We assume that the only available transitions from
s1 and s2 are self-loops, and the other transition relations are as depicted in
the graph. Suppose player I wants to maximize the probability to enforce the
property 3φ, and player II aims to minimize it.
Since the strategies applied on s1 and s2 do not matter, we focus on the
choices of actions from both players on s0. We first focus on memoryless strate-
gies, and let player I’s strategy pi1 gives pi1(γ)(a1) = p and pi1(γ)(a2) = 1 − p
for all γ ∈ S+. Similarly we let II assign probability q to b1 and 1 − q to b2 all
the time. This produces an infinite tree, on which we write xs0(I) for the actual
probability I can achieve 3φ from s0, given the above memoryless strategies.
(Note that xs1(I) = 0 and xs2(I) = 1 in all cases.) This establishes an equation
which further derives xs0(I) =
(1−p)+(2p−1)q
(1−p)+pq . A simple analysis shows that when
p approaches 1, the minimal value of xs0(I) approaches 1 as well, for all choices
of q. That is, there exists a strategy for player I to enforce 3φ with probability
1 − ε for all ε > 0. However, if player I chooses p = 1, player II may set q = 0
so that a play will be trapped in s0 for ever that yields xs0(I) = 0. The result
of [9] shows that in this case player I cannot do better even with general (history
dependent) strategies. In fact there are no strategies for player I to enforce 3φ
with probability 1. uunionsq
Indeed, 〈A〉ψ(s) can be almost the best, i.e., we have G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉≥ 〈A〉ψ(s)−εψ for
all ε > 0 [8]. Nevertheless, the quantitative version of determinacy [14] ensures
that for all LTL formulas ψ and s ∈ S, we have
〈A〉ψ(s) + 〈A〉¬ψ(s) = 1
The PATL model checking problems can be solved by calculating the values
〈A〉ψs(s) for each state s, where each local objective ψs related to s might be
distinct. The algorithms of [9] define monotonic functions of type (S → [0, 1])→
(S → [0, 1]) to arbitrarily approach a vector {〈A〉ψs(s)}s∈S in a game struc-
ture with finite state space S with respect to an ω-regular winning objective ψ.
Within each step one has to go through O(|S|) matrix games, and each iteration
produces a unique fixed point. The algorithms on safety and reachability objec-
tives are special cases of solving stochastic games [18]. More complex properties
can be expressed as nested fixed points [9]. Therefore, the upper bound complex-
ities become exponential to the size of the winning objectives translated from
LTL formulas. More recently, alternative algorithms proposed in [6] prove that
for quantitative games with ω-regular winning objectives expressed as parity
conditions, whether the values of a game is within [r− , r+ ] can be decided in
NP ∩ coNP for all rational r ∈ [0, 1] and  > 0, which improves the theoretical
upper bound for estimating the optimal values.
It has been shown in [9] that for safety games there always exist optimal
strategies for the protagonists, however for reachability games it is not always
the case. We generalise results on the existence of optimal strategies for PATL
path formulas as follows. Note that the result for unbounded release R has not
been studied in the literature, to the authors’ knowledge, and the rest of the
lemma is derivable from [9].
Lemma 2. Let s be a state, ψ be a path formula, and A the set of protagonists.
1. If ψ is of the form©φ, φ1U≤kφ2, φ1R≤kφ2, or φ1Rφ2 with k ∈ N, there always
exists a joint optimal strategy for A that enforces ψ on s with probability at
least 〈A〉ψ(s).
2. If ψ is of the form φ1Uφ2, there always exists a joint -optimal strategy for
A that enforces ψ on s with probability at least 〈A〉ψ(s)− , for all  > 0.
The next results prove the existence of a joint A strategy to enforce an PATL
path formula with probability greater than α if there exists a joint strategy to en-
force that formula with probability greater than α against an optimal A strategy.
These two lemmas are essential for the proof of the main result (Theorem 1).
Lemma 3. Let ψ be a PATL path formula and pi′ be a joint optimal strategy for
the antagonists A on state s, if there exists a joint strategy pi for the protagonists
A such that PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ}) > α, then G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉>αψ.
Proof. Since pi′ is the optimal strategy for the antagonists, we have for all joint
strategies pi′′, PrG(pi′′∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi′′ ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ}) ≤ 〈A〉ψ(s), then we
have 〈A〉ψ(s) > α. If there exists an optimal joint strategy for A then we have
s |= 〈〈A〉〉≥〈A〉ψ(s)ψ, which implies s |= 〈〈A〉〉>αψ. Otherwise by Lemma 2 there
exists an -optimal joint strategy for A with small  > 0 to enforce ψ with
probability at least 〈A〉ψ(s)−  > α. This also gives us s |= 〈〈A〉〉>αψ. uunionsq
This result does not hold if we replace the operator “>” by “≥” for unbounded
until U. This is because if there does not exist a joint optimal strategy for A to
enforce φ1Uφ2 with probability ≥ α, we have no space to insert a tiny  > 0 as we
did in the above proof. For the fragment of path formulas without unbounded
until, we extend the results for ≥, by the fact that optimal joint strategies for A
always exist for these path modalities, as stated by the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For path formulas ψ in the form of ©φ or φ1U≤kφ2 and optimal
strategies pi′ of A for the antagonists A on state s, if there exists a joint strategy
pi for the protagonists A such that PrG(pi∪pi′,s)({ρ ∈ G(pi ∪ pi′, s) | ρ |= ψ}) ./ α,
then G, s |= 〈〈A〉〉./αψ, where k ∈ N and ./∈ {>,≥}.
A-PATL
We define a sublogic of PATL by focusing on a particular set of players. Similar to
the approach of [3], we only allow negations to appear on the level of propositions.
Let A ⊆ Σ, an A-PATL formula φ is a state formula defined as follows:
φ := p | ¬p | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | 〈〈A′〉〉./α© φ | 〈〈A′〉〉./αφ1U≤kφ2 | 〈〈A′〉〉>αφ1Uφ2
where k ∈ N, ./∈ {>,≥} and A′ ⊆ A. Write LA for the set of A-PATL formulas.
An A-PATL formula describes a property that players in A are able to ensure
with a minimal expectation by their joint strategies. Note that we only allow
‘> α’ in the construction of unbounded until.
5 Probabilistic Alternating Simulation Relations
We define probabilistic versions of alternating simulation [3]. An alternating
simulation is a two-step simulation. For a sketch, suppose state s is simulated
by state t. In the first step the protagonists choose their actions on t to simulate
the behavior of the protagonists on s, and in the second step the antagonists
choose actions on s to respond to the behavior of the antagonists on t. This
somehow results in a simulation-like relation, so that for a certain property the
protagonists can enforce on s, they can also enforce it on t. To this end we
split Σ into two groups of players — one group of protagonist and the other
group of antagonist. Subsequently, we consider only the two-player case in a
probabilistic game structure — player I for the protagonist and player II for the
antagonist, since what we can achieve in the two-player case naturally extends to
a result in systems with two complementary sets of players, i.e., A∪A = Σ. For
readability we also write the transition functions as δ(s, a1, a2) and δ(s, pi1, pi2)
for δ(s, 〈a1, a2〉) and δ(s, 〈pi1, pi2〉), respectively.
Let S, T be two sets and R ⊆ S × T be a relation, then R ⊆ D(S)×D(T ) is
defined by ∆RΘ if there exists a weight function w : S × T → [0, 1] satisfying
–
∑
t∈T w(s, t) = ∆(s) for all s ∈ S,
–
∑
s∈S w(s, t) = Θ(t) for all t ∈ T ,
– sR t for all s ∈ S and t ∈ T with w(s, t) > 0.
Based on the notion of lifting, we define the probabilistic alternating simula-
tion relation for player I that extends the alternating simulation relation of [3].
The definition for player II can be made in a similar way.
Definition 1. Consider G,G′ as two probabilistic game structures. A probabilis-
tic alternating I-simulation v⊆ S × S′ is a relation satisfying if s v s′, then
– L(s) = L′(s′),
– for all pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I , there exists pi′1 ∈ ΠG
′,1
I , such that for all pi′2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , there
exists pi2 ∈ ΠG,1II , such that δ(s, pi1, pi2)v δ′(s′, pi′1, pi′2).
Note we use level-1 strategies instead of actions (or distributions on actions)
on establishing simulations, as in a game structure it is more natural to define
simulation in a behavior -based way. Also note that a distribution on level-1
strategies yields a level-1 strategy.
Next we propose the notion of probabilistic alternating forward simulation,
as per Segala [19], which relates a state to a distribution of states. This requires
a different way of lifting. Let R ⊆ S × D(S) be a relation, write R for the
smallest relation satisfying ∆RΘ if there exists an index set {pi}i∈I satisfying
Σi∈Ipi = 1, such that ∆ = Σi∈Ipi · si, Θ = Σi∈Ipi ·Θi and siRΘi for all i. Now
we define the probabilistic alternating forward simulation relation for player I,
and the definition for player II can be made in a similar way.
Definition 2. Consider two probabilistic game structures G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉
and G′ = 〈S′, s′0,L′, Act′, δ′〉. A probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation
vf⊆ S ×D(S′) is a relation satisfying if s vf ∆′, then
– L(s) = L′(s′) for all s′ ∈ d∆′e,
– for all pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I , there exists pi′1 ∈ ΠG
′,1
I , such that for all pi′2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , there
exists pi2 ∈ ΠG,1II , such that δ(s, pi1, pi2)vf δ′(∆′, pi′1, pi′2).
Lemma 5. s v t implies s vf t.
This lemma says that every probabilistic alternating simulation is a probabilis-
tic forward simulation with a point distribution on the right hand side of the
relation. The other way does not hold, i.e., probabilistic alternating forward
simulation relates strictly more game structures than probabilistic alternating
simulation. In Fig. 2 (which is essentially of [20]), we assume ActI and ActII are
both singleton sets. One may find that there are no states in the set {s′2, s′3, s′4, s′5}
in Fig. 2(b) that can simulate states s3 and s5 in Fig. 2(a). Therefore, we can-
not establish a probabilistic alternating simulation from s1 to s′1. However, s1 is
related to s′1 by probabilistic alternating forward simulation, since s3 (s5) can
be related to a uniform distribution over s′2 and s
′
3 (s
′
4 and s
′
5). The next result
shows that the definition of forward simulation also works on the lifted relation.
Lemma 6. If ∆vfΘ, then for all pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I , there exists pi2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
I , such that
for all pi′2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , there exists pi′1 ∈ ΠG,1II , such that δ(∆,pi1, pi′1)vf δ(Θ, pi2, pi′2).
Consequently, we are able to show that lifted probabilistic alternating forward
simulations are transitive.
Corollary 1. (Transitivity of alternating forward simulation) Let vf be a prob-
abilistic alternating forward I-simulation, then ∆1vf∆2 and ∆2vf∆3 implies
∆1vf∆3.
6 Forward I-Simulation is Sound for I-PATL
This section establishes the main result of the paper: a relationship between
probabilistic forward I-simulation and I-PATL formulas. Recall that a I-PATL
Fig. 2. An example showing that probabilistic alternating forward simulation is strictly
weaker than probabilistic alternating simulation.
formula has only strategy modalities 〈〈I〉〉 and 〈〈∅〉〉, and negations are only al-
lowed to appear immediately before the propositions. For readability we write
〈〈I〉〉 for 〈〈{I}〉〉. Let G and G′ be two PGSs, ∆ ∈ D(S) and ∆′ ∈ D(S′) such that
∆vf∆′ by a probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation. We need to show
that ∆ |= φ implies ∆′ |= φ for all I-PATL formula φ.
Our proof relies on the existence of player II’s optimal strategies for path
formulas as winning objectives (as shown in Sect. 4). Suppose pi1 is a I strategy
that enforces φ, we construct another I strategy pi′1 that simulates pi all along
the way, in the sense that provided the optimal II strategy pi′2 there exists an-
other II strategy pi2 such that the probabilistic execution E(G, 〈pi1, pi2〉, ∆) will
be “simulated” by the probabilistic execution E(G′, 〈pi′1, pi′2〉, ∆′). Since pi1 en-
forces φ, E(G, 〈pi1, pi2〉, ∆) satisfies φ, and we show that it is also the case of
E(G′, 〈pi′1, pi′2〉, ∆′).
Let E = 〈E,∆,LE , δE〉 and E ′ = 〈E′, ∆′,LE′ , δE′〉 be probabilistic executions
of G and G′, respectively. Also let vf⊆ S ×D(S′) be a probabilistic alternating
forward I-simulation. We say the pair (E , E ′) is an instance of simulation, by
writing E v E ′, if there exists a (simulation) relation v′⊆ E ×D(E′), such that
– ∆v′∆′,
– if e v′ Θ then last(e) vf last(Θ),
– if e v′ Θ then δE(e)vδE′(Θ),
where last(Θ) is a distribution satisfying last(Θ)(s) =
∑
last(e)=sΘ(e). A few
properties of the relation v′ are as follows.
Lemma 7. 1. ∆v′Θ implies δE(∆)v′δE′(Θ).
2. ∆v′Θ and ∆ = ∆1 ⊕α ∆2 with α ∈ [0, 1], then there exist Θ1, Θ2 such that
∆1v′Θ1, ∆2v′Θ2, and Θ = Θ1 ⊕α Θ2.
Let ∆ be a state distribution of G, ∆′ be a state distribution of G′, and ∆vf∆′.
Suppose pi1 is a I strategy in G that enforces φ with probability at least α, and pi′2
is a II strategy in G′, step-by-step we establish a I strategy pi′1 and a II strategy
pi2, so that the probabilistic executution decided by pi1 and pi2 from ∆ will be
simulated by the probabilistic executution decided by pi′1 and pi
′
2 from ∆
′.
Lemma 8. Let G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉 and G′ = 〈S′, s′0,L′, Act′, δ′〉 be two PGSs.
If ∆vf∆′, then for all pi1 ∈ ΠGI and pi′2 ∈ ΠG
′
II , there exists pi′1 ∈ ΠG
′
I and
pi2 ∈ ΠGII, such that E(G, 〈pi1, pi2〉, ∆) v E ′(G′, 〈pi′1, pi′2〉, ∆′).
In order to measure the probability of a path formula to be satisfied when
the strategies from both player I and player II are fixed, we define a relation
|=./α for probabilistic executions.
Definition 3. Let G be a probabilistic game structure, E(∆) = 〈E,∆,LE , δE〉 a
probabilistic execution determined by a vector piE , and ψ a path formula, define
E(∆) |=./α ψ iff Pr∆E ({ρ ∈
⋃
s∈d∆e
G(piE , s) | ρ |= ψ}) ./ α
It is conceivable that in a probabilistic execution every finite or infinite trace
in E∗ ∪ Eω maps to a trace in G, in the way that ρ = e1e2e3 . . . is a trace in
E implies that proj(ρ) = last(e1)last(e2)last(e3) . . . is a play in G, where the
function proj projects every finite sequence of states in E into its last state in S.
Consequently, we let Pr∆E be a probabilistic measure over E
ω, such that for the
cone sets (of finite traces), we have Pr∆E (e) = ∆(last(e)), and Pr
∆
E (γ · e1 · e2) =
Pr∆E (γ · e1) · δE(e1)(e2), for γ ∈ E∗ and e1, e2 ∈ E. Let ρ be an infinite trace
in E , we write ρ |= ψ iff proj(ρ) |= ψ. Similarly, for a state formula φ and
e ∈ E, write e ∈ JφK iff last(e) ∈ JφK. In the following we study the properties of
the satisfaction relation for a probabilistic execution to satisfy a I-PATL path
formula by means of unfolding.
Lemma 9. Let φ, φ1 and φ2 be I-PATL (state) formulas, and ./∈ {>,≥} then
1. E(∆) |=./α ©φ iff there exists α′ ./ α, such that δE(∆) = ∆1 ⊕α′ ∆2 with
d∆1e ∩ d∆2e = ∅, and ∆1 |= φ.
2. E(∆) |=./α φ1U≤kφ2 iff there exists a finite sequence of triples {〈(∆i,0, αi,0),
(∆i,1, αi,1), (∆i,2, αi,2)〉}0≤i≤j for some j ≤ k, with d∆i,`e ∩ d∆i,`′e = ∅ for
all distinct `, `′ ∈ {0, 1, 2} and 0 ≤ i ≤ j, such that
(1)
∑
i∈[0...j]
αi,1 · ∏
i′∈[0...i−1]
αi′,0
 ./ α,
(2) ∆ =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} α0,` ·∆0,`, and δE(∆i,0) =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} αi+1,` ·∆i+1,` for
all 0 ≤ i < j, (3) ∆i,0 |= φ1 and ∆i,1 |= φ2 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ j.
3. E(∆) |=./α φ1U φ2 iff there exists a finite or infinite sequence of triples
{〈(∆i,0, αi,0), (∆i,1, αi,1), (∆i,2, αi,2)〉}0≤i<j for some j ∈ N+ ∪ {∞}, with
d∆i,`e ∩ d∆i,`′e = ∅ for all distinct `, `′ ∈ {0, 1, 2} and 0 ≤ i < j, such that
(1)
∑
0≤i<j
αi,1 · ∏
i′∈[0...i−1]
αi′,0
 ./ α,
(2) ∆ =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} α0,` ·∆0,`, and δE(∆i,0) =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} αi+1,` ·∆i+1,` for
all 0 ≤ i < j, (3) ∆i,0 |= φ1 and ∆i,1 |= φ2 for all 0 ≤ i < j.
Theorem 1. Let G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉 and G′ = 〈S′, s′0,L′, Act′, δ′〉 be two
PGSs, vf⊆ S×D(S′) a probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation. If ∆vf∆′,
then G, ∆ |= φ implies G′, ∆′ |= φ for all φ ∈ LI.
Proof. (sketch) We prove by induction on the structure of a I-PATL formula φ.
Base case: suppose ∆ |= p, then s |= p for all s ∈ d∆e. By ∆vf∆′, there exists
an index set {qi}i∈I satisfying
∑
i∈I qi = 1, ∆ =
∑
i∈I qisi, ∆
′ =
∑
i∈I qi∆i,
and si vf ∆i. Therefore L(si) = L′(t) for all t ∈ d∆ie. So t |= p for all t ∈ d∆ie
for all i. Therefore ∆′ |= p. The case of ¬p is similar.
We show the case when φ = 〈〈I〉〉>αφ1Uφ2, and the proof methods for the
other PATL path constructors are similar. Since for all t ∈ d∆′e there exists an
optimal strategy pit for the winning objective ¬φ1R¬φ2 by Lemma 2(1), and we
combine these strategies into a single strategy pi′2 satisfying pi
′
2(t · α) = pit(t · α)
for all t ∈ d∆′e and α ∈ S∗. Then pi′2 is optimal for ¬φ1R¬φ2 on ∆′. Then
by Lemma 8, there exist pi2 ∈ ΠGII and pi′1 ∈ ΠG
′
I such that E(G, 〈pi1, pi2〉, ∆) v
E ′(G′, 〈pi′1, pi′2〉, ∆′). Since pi1 enforces φ1Uφ2 with probability greater than α,
we have E(∆) |=>α φ1Uφ2. By Lemma 9(3) there exists a sequence of triples
{〈(∆i,0, αi,0), (∆i,1, αi,1), (∆i,2, αi,2)〉}0≤i<j for some j ∈ N+ ∪ {∞} satisfying
the properties as stated in Lemma 9(3). By repetitively applying Lemma 7 we es-
tablish another sequence of triples {〈(∆′i,0, αi,0), (∆′i,1, αi,1), (∆′i,2, αi,2)〉}0≤i<j ,
such that (1)
∑
0≤i<j(αi,1 ·
∏
i′∈[0...i−1] αi′,0) > α, (2) ∆
′ =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} α0,` ·∆′0,`,
and δE(∆′i,0) =
∑
`∈{0,1,2} αi+1,` · ∆′i+1,` for all 0 ≤ i < j, (3) ∆i,0vf∆′i,0 and
∆i,1vf∆′i,1 for all 0 ≤ i < j. By induction hypothesis we have ∆′i,0 |= φ1 and
∆′i,1 |= φ2 for all 0 ≤ i < j. Therefore E(∆′) |=>α φ1Uφ2 by Lemma 9(3). Since
pi′2 is an optimal strategy of II, we have ∆
′ |= 〈〈I〉〉>αφ1Uφ2 by Lemma 3.
For a formula 〈〈∅〉〉./αψ we apply the same proof strategies as for 〈〈I〉〉./αψ,
except that player I does not need to enforce ψ with a certain probability ./ α
since every probabilistic execution generated by a pair of I and II strategies will
enforce ψ with that probability. uunionsq
7 Probabilistic Alternating Bisimulation
If a probabilistic alternating simulation is symmetric, we call it a probabilistic
alternating bisimulation.
Definition 4. Consider two probabilistic game structures G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉
and G′ = 〈S′, s′0,L′, Act′, δ′〉. A probabilistic alternating I-bisimulation '⊆ S ×
S′ is a symmetric relation satisfying if s ' s′, then
– L(s) = L′(s′),
– for all pi1 ∈ ΠG,1I , there exists pi′1 ∈ ΠG
′,1
I , such that for all pi′2 ∈ ΠG
′,1
II , there
exists pi2 ∈ ΠG,1II , such that δ(s, pi1, pi2)' δ′(s′, pi′1, pi′2),
where ' is a lifting of ' by weight functions.
Since every probabilistic alternating I-simulation is also a probabilistic al-
ternating forward I-simulation by treating the right hand side state as a point
distribution (Lemma 5), the lifted probabilistic alternating I-simulation is also a
lifted probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation. This fact extends for bisim-
ulation. A probabilistic alternating I-bisimulation also preserves formulas in LI.
Moreover, we write L+I for the set of formulas defined as follows, which allows
negations to appear anywhere in a formula, and further we are able to show that
probabilistic alternating bisimulation preserves all properties expressed in L+I .
φ := p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | 〈〈A′〉〉./α© φ | 〈〈A′〉〉./αφ1U≤kφ2 | 〈〈A′〉〉>αφ1Uφ2
Theorem 2. Let G = 〈S, s0,L, Act, δ〉 and G′ = 〈S′, s′0,L′, Act′, δ′〉 be two
PGSs, '⊆ S × S′ is a probabilistic alternating I-bisimulation. For all s ∈ S
and s′ ∈ S′ with s ' s′ and φ ∈ L+I , we have G, s |= φ iff G′, s′ |= φ.
The proof methodology basically follows that of Theorem 1, besides that when-
ever∆'∆′ and∆ |= ¬φ, we show that if there were s′ ∈ d∆e′ such that G′, s′ |= φ
then we would also have G, s |= φ for some s ∈ d∆e, which is a contradiction.
And from that we have ∆′ |= ¬φ as well.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We report our first results on probabilistic alternating simulation relations. We
have introduced two notions of simulation for probabilistic game structures —
probabilistic alternating simulation and probabilistic alternating forward simu-
lation, following the seminal works of Segala and Lynch [19, 21] on probabilistic
simulation relations and the work of Alur et al. [3] on alternating refinement re-
lations for non-probabilistic game structures. Our main effort has been devoted
to a logical characterization for probabilistic alternating simulation relations, by
showing that they preserve a fragment of PATL formulas. It is worth noting that
on our way to the main result, we find that the proof strategy accommodated
in [3] no longer applies, due to the failure in reconstructing a strategy from sub-
strategies when the system transitions become probabilistic. We circumvent this
problem by incorporating the results of probabilistic determinacy [14] and the
existence of optimal strategies [9] in stochastic games. A full version of the paper
is available as a technical report [23].
There are several ways to proceed. We want to study the completeness of
logical characterization for probabilistic alternating forward simulation. It is also
of our interest to investigate the complexity for checking probabilistic alternating
simulation relations by studying the results in the literature [3, 5]. Our work was
partially motivated by the paper [4], where PATL is used to formalize a balanced
property for a probabilistic contract signing protocol. Here, a balanced protocol
means that a dishonest participant never has a strategy to unilaterally determine
the outcome of the protocol. It is interesting to see how much the development
of simulation relations for probabilistic game structures can help the verification
of such kind of security protocols.
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